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FOREWORD: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Allan Ides*
Constitutionalism begins with a profound and universal
commitment to the rule of law. Consistent with that commitment, all
actors within any given constitutional system, governors and
governed alike, are subject to and bound by the law of the
constitution.
The dilemma of constitutionalism is how one
transforms this rule-of-law commitment into a sustainable practice.
In fact, there is no fail-safe method since any approach to
constitutional enforcement must necessarily be applied by ordinary
human beings subject to the very vicissitudes constitutionalism is
meant to curb. There is, however, a preferred methodology, one that
has evolved through the Anglo-American system of justice, namely,
the process of judicial review, by which I mean the enforceable
constitutional review of government action by an independent
judicial body.
Although judicial review is most often thought of as a structural
check on the exercise of governmental power, it can also be
characterized accurately as a fundamental right held by the
constitutional constituency. Indeed, it is the most fundamental right,
for without it (or some yet-to-be devised alternative) the rule-of-law
promise of constitutionalism must remain nothing more than an
analgesic illusion. This is as fully true of domestic constitutions as it
is of transnational constitutions. In fact, it is now safe to say that a
constitution without an effective method of judicial review is not a
constitution at all. The extent to which the judiciary lacks
independence from those who exercise political power is a direct
measure of the frailty of the underlying constitution.
This collection of articles provides an opportunity to examine
judicial review as it operates under a variety of constitutions, written
* James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
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as well as unwritten, each freighted and blessed with its own unique
cultural norms.
Professor Douglas Edlin1 has contributed an excellent
comparison of the exercise of judicial review in the context of two
similar "detainee" cases, one arising in the United Kingdom and the
other pending in United States. Both cases involve individuals who
were arrested as part of the so-called war on terror and who then
challenged their detentions as inconsistent with the principles
underlying habeas corpus and the rule of law. Professor Edlin
examines each case and explores the various methods adopted by the
respective judges in either redressing or circumventing the
underlying constitutional principles.
Among other things, he
demonstrates the richness of constitutional discourse in the AngloAmerican tradition and the importance of situating judicial review as
a core constitutional value.
We then turn to an example of judicial review as practiced
within the continental system of Europe. Professor Enrique Guill~n
L6pez' provides a fascinating guide through the complex process of
judicial review as it operates under the Spanish Constitution of 1978.
As the reader will see, that process differs significantly from the
process most familiar to lawyers in the United States. And yet,
despite a variety of technical differences, Professor Guill~n L6pez
ably demonstrates that the Spanish system is ultimately premised on
the universal rule-of-law principle found at the heart of
constitutionalism. He also shows how the unique characteristics of
the Spanish system are in significant measure a product of Spanish
culture and politics. Our system of judicial review in the United
States is, of course, similarly freighted with political and cultural
norms, leaving one to wonder what might be gained if we focused
more on the core value of judicial review and less on the politically
freigtened technicalities of the underlying doctrine-a point
Professor Edlin emphasizes in his article.

1. Douglas E. Edlin, Institutional Identity and the Rule of Law: Belmarsh, Boumediene,
and the Construction of ConstitutionalMeaning in England and the United States, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 481 (2008).
2. Enrique Guillkn L6pez, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 529 (2008).
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The next two articles pertain to the practice of judicial review in
China and Japan respectively. Professor M. Ulric Killion3 examines
constitutionalism and judicial review as practiced within China. He
too notes the necessary relationship between culture, politics, and
constitutionalism, and he argues that the ideals of constitutionalism
can not thrive within a judicial regime that is constrained by Marxist
ideology. In Professor Killion's view, under such circumstances the
judicial function simply replicates a political judgment. Thus, he
argues that the current status of constitutionalism in China is
problematic from a rule-of-law perspective since a particularized
ideology and centralized political power remain key components of
the constitutional order.
Professor Jun-ichi Satoh4 provides a survey of the role judicial
review has played under the Japanese Constitution. His article too
reflects the principle that culture and politics play a significant role
in defining the scope and nature of judicial review. The system
described by Professor Satoh lacks the relatively aggressive character
of judicial review as practiced under the American model. Rather,
judicial review as exercised in Japan appears to be more constrained
and circumspect as a matter of institutional function. Constitutional
discourse is, at least in part, melded into the legislative process. The
result is a relatively limited number of decisions invalidating
legislation on constitutional grounds.
Finally, Professor Christopher Whytock5 extends an enticing
invitation to constitutional comparativists: enter the realm of social
science and examine empirically the manner in which different
constitutional models and configurations function. What are the
consequences of choosing a particular constitutional model? And
what is the causal relationship between the chosen constitutional
structure or standard and various political and economic outcomes?
For example, to what extent might a presidential model as opposed to
a parliamentary model increase or decrease the amount of
3. M. Ulric Killion, "Building Up" China's Constitution: Culture, Marxism, and the WTO
Rules, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 563 (2008).
4. Jun-ichi Satoh, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of the Case Law and an
Examination of Trends in the JapaneseSupreme Court's ConstitutionalOversight, 41 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 603 (2008).
5. Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional
Law: Insightsfrom Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 629 (2008).
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government spending? Following these lines of thought, Professor
Whytock argues persuasively for the development of an
interdisciplinary, real-world perspective on what one might call the
functioning constitution. As part of his persuasive case, he offers an
example of his own empirical work in which he uses the tools of
social science to examine the economic consequences of the
presidential and parliamentary models. In short, Professor Whytock
invites us to move beyond descriptive comparisons and into the
realm of constitutionalism as it functions in the real world.

